Advanced Persistent reat (APT) is one of the most serious types of cyber a acks, which is a new and more complex version of multistep a ack. Within the APT life cycle, continuous communication between infected hosts and Command and Control (C&C) servers is maintained to instruct and guide the compromised machines.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber a acks refer to intentional activities against so ware, hardware or data in computer networks or systems. ese activities may degrade, disrupt, destroy, or deny access to legitimate users. Many Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ICFNDS '17, Cambridge, United Kingdom © 2017 ACM. 978-1-4503-4844-7/17/07. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/3102304.3102331 intelligence agencies and governments' militaries are actively getting ready to launch or block cyber a acks, maybe in conjunction with traditional a acks or counter-a acks. Cyber exploitation is another expression, which refers to intelligence-gathering rather than devastating actions [17] . e goal is to get information and data without ge ing caught or being detected. As the number of ubiquitous devices grow [1, 2, 33-35, 42, 47, 50] , the number of the security threats with implication for the general public increases. Unfortunately, new technologies, such as the Internet of ings, comes with new set of security threat that needs to be addressed.
Over the last decade, malware and botnets [28, 31] have increased to become a key reason of the majority of the (Distributed) Denial-of-Service (DOS) activities [38] , direct a acks [4] , spear phishing [22] and scanning [51] , which takes place through the Internet. Botnets are networks formed by "enslaving" host computers, called bots (derived from the word robot), that are controlled by one or more a ackers, called botmasters, with the intention of performing malicious activities [5] . In other words, bots are malicious codes running on host computers that allow botmasters to control the host computers remotely and make them perform various actions [15] . It has been noticed that there is a change in motivation, from curiosity and fame seeking/excitement-seeking to illegal nancial gain, this has been marked by a rising sophistication in the evolution of malicious so ware [16] . Moreover, the availability of easy-to-use tool kits to build malware will probably keep malware a threat to consumers, businesses and governments in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, network monitoring approaches [52] have become more and more important in modern complicated networks.
One of the most serious types of cyber a acks is the Advanced Persistent reat (APT) [20] , which is targeting a speci c organisation and it is performed through several steps. e main aim of APT is espionage and then data ex ltration. erefore, APT is considered as a new and more complex version of multi-step a ack [36] .
ese APTs form a problem for current detection methods [19] as they use advanced techniques like social engineering [27] and make use of unknown vulnerabilities. Moreover, the economic damages due to a successful APT a ack can be very expensive. e expected cost of a acks is the major motivation for the investments in intrusion detection and prevention systems [46] . APTs are currently one of the most serious threats to the companies and governments [54] .
A novel approach for APT detection is proposed in [26] . e suggested system undergoes two main phases, the rst one detects eight techniques commonly used in APT life cycle. For that purpose, eight detection modules are presented, which are disguised exe le detection [18] , malicious le hash detection [25] , malicious domain name detection [24] , malicious IP address detection [23] , malicious SSL certi cate detection, domain ux detection [21] , scan detection, and Tor connection detection [30] . e second phase includes a correlation framework to link the outputs of the detection modules.
Within the APT life cycle, continuous communication between the infected hosts and the C&C servers should be preserved to instruct and guide the compromised machines. ese communications are usually protected by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption, making it di cult to identify if the tra c directed to sites is malicious. is paper presents the malicious SSL certi cate detection (MSSLD) module, which aims at detecting the APT C&C communications based on a blacklist of malicious SSL certi cates.
is blacklist consists of two forms of SSL certi cates, the SHA1 ngerprints and the serial & subject, that are associated with malware and malicious activities. In this detection module, the network tra c is processed and all secure connections are ltered. e SSL certi cate of each secure connection is then matched with the SSL certi cate blacklist. e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work to APT detection.
e malicious SSL certi cate detection module and its algorithms are explained in Section 3. Section 4 shows the evaluation results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
A classi cation model for APT detection is presented in [14] . is model is built based on machine learning algorithms. First, the legitimate tra c for normal users is analysed aiming to extract the CPU usage, memory usage, open ports and number of les in the system32 folder. A piece of malware, which is previously used for the APT a ack, is injected into the network and the four features are extracted.
e dataset of benign and malicious features are used to train the detection model using di erent machine learning algorithms.
TerminAPTor, an APT detector, is described in [12] . is detector uses information ow tracking to nd the links between the elementary a acks, which are triggered within the APT life cycle. TerminAPTor depends on an agent, which can be a standard intrusion detection system, to detect those elementary a acks. A statistical APT detector, similar to TerminAPTor detector, is developed in [48] .
is system considers that APT undergoes ve states which are delivery, exploit, installation, C&C and actions; and several activities are taken in each state. e generated events in each state are correlated in a statistical manner.
An APT detection system based on C&C domains detection is introduced in [53] . is work analyses the C&C communication based on the observation that the access to C&C domains is independent, while the access to legal domains is correlated.
An approach for APT detection based on spear phishing detection is explored in [13] . is approach depends on mathematical and computational analysis to lter spam emails. Tokens, which are considered as a group of words and characters such as (click here, free, Viagra, replica), should be de ned for the detection algorithm to separate legitimate and spam emails.
An active-learning-based framework for malicious PDFs detection is suggested in [40] . ese malicious PDFs can be used in the early steps of APT to get the point of entry.
An approach based on Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) is proposed in [49] . is approach focuses on detecting the last step of APT which is the data ex ltration. A DLP algorithm is used to process the data tra c to detect data leaks and generate " ngerprints" according to the features of the leak.
A context-based framework for APT detection is explained in [32] . is framework is based on modelling APT as an a ack pyramid in which the top of the pyramid represents the a ack goal, and the lateral planes indicates the environments involved in the APT life cycle.
An in-depth analysis of Duqu is presented in [7] . A European organisation was targeted by a ackers using the Duqu malware to steal data. e authors propose the Duqu detector toolkit, which consists of six investigation tools developed to detect the Duqu malware involved in the APT a acks.
With regards to the processing of multiple streams of events, IBM suggests a conceptual model for event processing in [39] . It describes the basic requirements to design an e cient correlation system. e work presented in [10] is based on nite state machines and uses a query language for event processing. Both systems can process the events in real time, a key limitation shared by both approaches is that they can not detect so called low & slow a acks, which take place over an extended time period.
Finally, APT detection systems face serious shortcomings in achieving real time detection [6] , detecting all APT a ack steps [6] , balance between false positive and false negative rates [7] , and correlating of events spanning over a long period of time [10, 39] . To address those weaknesses, a new approach for APT detection has been presented in [26] , and this paper is a step towards developing the proposed system.
MALICIOUS SSL CERTIFICATE DETECTION (MSSLD)
APT C&C communications are usually protected by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption, which makes it di cult to identify malicious tra c. MSSLD aims at detecting C&C communications based on a blacklist of malicious SSL certi cates [3, 37] . is blacklist consists of two forms of SSL certi cates, the SHA1 ngerprints and the serial & subject, which are associated with malware and malicious activities. As shown in Figure 1 , the network tra c is processed and all secure connections are ltered. e SSL certi cate of each secure connection is then matched with the SSL certi cate blacklist. e MSSLD module is implemented on top of the Bro [29, 43] passive, open-source network tra c analyser. It is primarily a security monitor, which inspects all tra c on a link in depth for signs of suspicious activity.
e most immediate bene t gained from deploying Bro is an extensive set of log les, which record a network's activity in high-level terms. ese logs include not only a comprehensive record of every connection seen on the wire, but also application-layer transcripts such as, e.g., all HTTP sessions with their requested URIs, key headers, MIME types, and server responses; DNS requests with replies; and much more. Bro event engine reduces the incoming packet stream into a series of higherlevel events, more than 300 events. ese events re ect network activity in policy-neutral terms, i.e., they describe what has been seen, but not why, or whether it is signi cant. e MSSLD module consumes and handles some of Bro events, explained later in Section 3.1; all connection information (such as timestamp, src ip, src port, dest ip, dest port) can be extracted from those events. is detection module runs through two algorithms, mentioned further in Section 3.1, the rst one is intelligence-based MSSLD and the second algorithm is event-based MSSLD. e intelligencebased MSSLD makes use of the Bro Intelligence Framework [11] .
is framework enables a ack detection modules to consume data from di erent data sources and make it available for matching.
MSSLD is a blacklist-based detection module in which the malicious SSL certi cates blacklists are automatically updated based on di erent intelligence feeds at once. e automatic update runs parallel with the module process and there is no need to stop or restart MSSLD. is parallel-running feature allows a continuous live monitoring of the network tra c and supports real time detection. Based on the MSSLD algorithm, two automatic update mechanisms have been applied. Figure 2 shows the automatic update of the blacklists used by intelligence-based MSSLD. e user crontab le is con gured to run blacklist update.sh each day at 3:00 am, this shell script connects through the Internet to the data source servers and downloads updated blacklists of malicious SSL certi cate hashes into a new blacklist.intel text le. is text le is connected to the Intelligence Framework, which consumes it as described in Section 3.1. Figure 3 : Automatic update of the blacklist used by eventbased MSSLD.
As an output of the MSSLD module, in case of a malicious SSL certi cate is detected, a corresponding event (ssl alert) is generated.
is event is to be used for alert correlation [8] . Additionally, an alert email is sent to the Request Tracker (RT) [9] , where the network security team can perform additional forensics and respond to the triggered alert. It is assumed that the network security team responds to the generated alert within 24 hours, therefore, MSSLD suppresses all the same alerts, the same alert is the one which has the same infected host and the same malicious SSL certi cate, into one alert per day, so no repeated alert emails sent the network security team. Moreover, this alert suppression reduces the computational cost of the alert correlation framework. To this end, a er an alert is generated, this module adds the triggered alert into a speci c table, the t suppress ssl alert, where it stays for one day to ensure that the module does not generate the same alert within the next 24 hours. When a malicious SSL certi cate is detected, and before an alert is generated, MSSLD checks the t suppress ssl alert table in order to conclude if the same alert has been generated during the previous day, if so, the alert is ignored. Along with generating a new alert, information regarding the alert and the malicious connection (alert type, timestamp, src ip, src port, dest ip, dest port, infected host, malicious ssl) is wri en into a speci c log, i.e., blacklist detection ssl.log, to keep a historical record of the monitored network.
MSSLD Algorithms
As the blacklist consists of two forms of malicious SSL certi cates (SHA1 ngerprints and serial & subject), two methods are followed for malicious SSL certi cate detection. e rst one is intelligencebased MSSLD, shown in Algorithm 1, and the second method is event-based MSSLD, shown in Algorithm 2.
In the intelligence-based MSSLD, the Bro Intelligence Framework is used and con gured to monitor all secure connections SSL certi cates' hashes. is framework is connected to the blacklist.intel le, which contains the SSL certi cate blacklist. A er extracting all secure connections tra c, SSL certi cates hashes are passed to the intelligence framework to be checked against the intelligence data set blacklist.intel. When a match with any indicator type of the intelligence data is found, the intelligence framework generates an Intel::match event.
rough this event, if the indicator type is CERT HASH, it means this connection has Algorithm 1 Implementation pseudo-code of intelligence-based MSSLD 1: Get malicious SSL certi cates hashes blacklist (blacklist.intel) 2: Filter secure connections tra c 3: Extract SSL certi cate hash 4: Send SSL certi cate hash to Bro Intelligence Framework 5: if SSL certi cate hash is in blacklist.intel then 6: if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored network then 7: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the last day then 8: Generate an event (ssl alert) 9: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log 10:
Send an alert email to RT
11:
Suppress the same ssl alert over the next day 12: end if 13: else if the connection destination IP belongs to the monitored network then 14: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the last day then 15: Generate an event (ssl alert) 16: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log 17: Send an alert email to RT goto End 25: end if 26: End a malicious SSL certi cate. Next, both connection sides, source and destination IP addresses, are checked through the is local addr function to check if the connection is established to or from the monitored network. To avoid raising the same alert within the same day, the t1 suppress ssl alert table is checked to ensure that it does not contain the same detected [host IP address, SSL certi cate hash] set.
MSSLD then generates ssl alert event, writes the malicious connection information into a speci c log blacklist detection ssl.log, sends an alert email regarding the malicious SSL certi cate detection to RT and adds the current detected set [host IP address, SSL certi cate hash] into t1 suppress ssl alert table.
e wri en information into blacklist detection ssl.log is: timestamp = s$conn$start_time alert_type = ssl_alert connection = s$conn$id infected_host = s$conn$id$orig_h malicious_ssl = s\ $indicator
In the event-based MSSLD, the network tra c is processed and ltered into secure connections tra c, and then x509 certi cate event can be generated for encountered X509 certi cates [45] .
rough this event, the serial and subject of the X509 certi cate are checked for the certi cate presence in the bad ssl group. is Algorithm 2 Implementation pseudo-code of event-based MSSLD if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored network then 7: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the last day then 8: Generate an event (ssl alert) 9: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log 10:
Suppress the same ssl alert over the next day 12: end if 13: else if the connection destination IP belongs to the monitored network then 14: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the last day then 15: Generate an event (ssl alert) 16: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log 17: Send an alert email to RT End group contains many of serials and subjects of malicious X509 certi cates. If a match is found, the module should determine if the connection is established to or from one of the monitored network hosts; accordingly, both the source and destination IP addresses are checked through is local addr function. Before an ssl alert is raised, the t2 suppress ssl alert table is to be checked to ensure that the same alert was not raised previously during the same day.
As in the previous intelligence-based method, MSSLD generates an ssl alert event, writes the malicious connection information into a speci c log, i.e., the blacklist detection ssl.log, sends an alert email regarding the malicious SSL certi cate detection to RT and adds the current detected set [host IP address, SSL certi cate hash] into t2 suppress ssl alert table.
EVALUATION RESULTS
To evaluate the MSSLD module, a virtual Internet-connected network was built, malware samples were injected into the virtual network, the network tra c was recorded into pcap les, and then the MSSLD module was applied on those pcap les.
As illustrated in Figure 4 , two Windows virtual machines were connected to a physical consumer-grade router, which provided connection to the Internet. e virtual machines behaved as physical computers in a home network and were able to communicate with each other.
e Virtual machines tra c was recorded into two separate pcap les using the nictrace VirtualBox functionality [41] . Because no so ware besides the operating system and the malware was installed on the virtual machines and the operating system updates were disabled, the majority of the captured tra c was initiated by the installed malware. Moreover, it becomes easy to establish the ground truth. Two malware samples were injected independently into the virtual network for 5 minutes each. e rst one is the Trojan.Win32.Inject.sbqz, also known as TorrentLocker, which has MD5 hash value of aabe2844ee61e1f2969d7a96e1355a99.
Internet
e second injected malware sample is the Trojan.Win32.Staser.bazr malware, which has MD5 hash value of e161a4d2716eb83552d3bd22ce5d603c.
e C&C servers for these two malware uses SSL certi cates for communication over h ps. When the MSSLD module was applied on the captured pcap les, it successfully detected the malicious tra c as shown in Figure 5 . 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
is paper presents the malicious SSL certi cate detection (MSSLD) module, which aims at detecting the APT C&C communications based on a blacklist of malicious SSL certi cates.
is blacklist consists of two forms of SSL certi cates, the SHA1 ngerprints and the serial & subject, that are associated with malware and malicious activities. is module, processes the network tra c and lters all secure connections. e SSL certi cate of each secure connection is then matched with the SSL certi cate blacklist.
For future work, the output of this module will be correlated with the outputs of other detection modules, developed to detect commonly used techniques over the APT life cycle, to raise an alert on APT detection.
